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Abstract
In his recent writings, Richard R. Nelson has expressed concern at the way
intellectual property has been developing. It has never been so much used as it is to-
day, and yet it has never been so widely criticised. To improve it, an EU Committee
of Experts has recommended consideration of this author’s  proposal to add a
financial dimension to the existing measurement of grants by time. Empirical work
that provides a first evaluation of such a possible change is reported, and some lines
are sketched out for more refined research on how it might be introduced.
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MEETING NELSON’S CONCERNS ABOUT INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
1. Introduction: Nelson’s concerns
Intellectual property is hardly mentioned in Nelson and Winter’s famous book, except
for some references to patents in Chapters 16 and 17. In recent years, however, it has
become “a kind of unrelenting economic force” (Merges 1996 p. 1294) and Nelson
has been paying correspondingly more attention to it in his writings.
Three examples will illustrate that he has serious doubts about the way in
which intellectual property has been developing. In discussing how recent growth in
interest in it is associated with a general view that “is heavily weighted toward the
proposition that strong and broad patent rights are conducive to economic progress,”
he urges caution in respect of this proposition (Mazzolini and Nelson 1998 p. 274).
Since he sees progress in any field of technology being made most rapidly when
several firms are making incremental  improvements to an invention along
overlapping or competing trajectories (cf. 2000a p. 67) he believes that early freedom
to use inventions should be an essential component of intellectual property (Merges
and Nelson 1990 p. 908). Unfortunately, what has been  happening is the opposite of
this. Thirdly, Nelson has expressed particular concern about “the intrusion of
intellectual property into what used to be the domain of public open science…I am
calling, more broadly, for rewriting patent law, or at least revising patent practice, to
keep intellectual property rights away from fundamental discoveries…” (2000b pp.
12, 15).
Intellectual property has indeed grown in importance with quite extraordinary
rapidity during the last two decades. Amongst the contributory factors have been the3
explosion of software development and the use of copyright and patents to protect it;
the growth of biotechnology and the patentability of its inventions; the development
of electronic databases and arrangements for protecting investment in them; the
multiplication of patents arising from University research; and the establishment in
1994 of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Section (TRIPS) of the World Trade
Organization with  the objective of bringing about  world-wide enforcement  of
intellectual property rights.
Yet, as the new professor of intellectual property law in the University of
Oxford recently stressed in his inaugural lecture (which in fact is an independent
endorsement of Nelson’s concerns) all  this formidable apparatus is “in crisis” (Vaver,
2000). Intellectual property protection has never been so much used, and at the same
time its operation has never been so widely criticised. The present Paper argues that
an important cause of this is the continued use of time as the measure of grants of
protection.  This is an inflexible means compared with the proper measure, which can
only be money, and the achievements of accounting make it no longer necessary so
suffer its disadvantages.
2. Details of the problems
There are two main roots of the present difficulties with intellectual property. The first
of these is the shift from individual to corporate production of what is to be protected.
In their origins, the two main types of modern intellectual property, patents and
copyright, were directed towards protecting the results of individual  creativity. This
was typically expressed in Article I.8 of the United States Constitution which gives
Congress power to legislate to confer exclusive rights on “inventors  and authors for
the protection of the creations of their minds.”  From the middle of the nineteenth
century, however, invention progressively became the output of purposive, large-scale4
research in corporate laboratories, rather than originating from “flashes of genius” on
the part of identifiable individuals. Similarly, with the arrival of recorded music, the
cinema and broadcasting, much literary and artistic creation, which is the subject-
matter of copyright, changed from being the output of independent individuals to
“works produced for hire.”
The second root of intellectual property’s modern disfunctionality is that
information and knowledge of quite new types have been emerging, and these have
been shoehorned into the existing system to give them protection. There is no
shortage of evidence that this process is becoming more and more difficult, and that
the results are progressively less satisfactory. These new kinds of information are
simply not receiving protection that is appropriate to their needs. Consequently, it is
now being argued that
The world’s one-dimensional intellectual property system must be overhauled
to create a more differentiated one. Trying to squeeze to-day’s developments
into yesterday’s system of intellectual property rights simply won’t work. One
size does not fit all (Thurow, 1997, p. 103).
2.1 System breakdown
It was never going to be easy to adjust intellectual property to take account of both of
these fundamental changes, and indeed this has been achieved only partially.
Intellectual property, in fact, is “frozen” into a dual patent-copyright paradigm, and a
typical expert statement of what has happened is the following:-
[T]he nineteenth century vision that subdivided world intellectual property law
into discrete and mutually exclusive compartments for industrial and artistic
property has irretrievably broken down. The theory that the classical patent
and copyright models coherently address the way intellectual creations behave
has been discredited by its inability to deal adequately with the behavior of5
many commercially valuable, cutting-edge intellectual creations. These recent
technological creations account for an ever-growing share of the gross
domestic products of both developed and developing countries (Kronz, 1983,
pp. 178, 180, quoted in Reichman, 1994, p. 2500).
3. Money in the measure of intellectual property grants.
Part of the overhaul which Thurow calls for should be to add money to time in the
measurement of intellectual property grants. This author’s proposal for such a change
was first mooted in 1987 and was then the subject of some empirical research in 1994.
It has recently been recommended for  official consideration by a European Union
expert advisory group in the following terms:
Invention and radical innovation can never be other than a cost from the point
of view of industry accounting procedures.  In to-day’s complex technologies,
money is only made by those firms that can develop them into commercial
products through subsequent incremental  changes.  There is now persuasive
evidence that progress in any field of technology is made most rapidly when
several firms are competing to capture a share of a new market, and to widen
the scope of application of an invention, through making such incremental
improvements along different and competitive “trajectories.”
The recognised comparative failure of European firms to
commercialise inventive and RTD efforts is partly explained by this. No firm
can exploit more than a single trajectory of incremental change properly.
Proprietary rights can prevent firms which could exploit other trajectories
from doing so, thus also depriving the originator of competitive pressure to
move along the learning curve as fast as possible. Eventually, products from
foreign firms which incorporate more incremental improvements, gain an
advantage in the market.6
A useful contribution towards solving this problem would be the
compulsory licensing of intellectual property, consistent with Articles 7, 8(1),
and 8(2) (though Article 31 should also be noted) of the Agreement on Trade
related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), subject to the
condition of maintaining, and if possible improving incentives to invent and
innovate.
It has been proposed with support from empirical research that this
could be achieved by changing from time to money as the measure of any
grant of intellectual property. The proper measure of any economic privilege,
in fact, can only be money. No doubt at the time when intellectual property
originated, any measure other than time was out of the question, since
accounting techniques were undeveloped.
But to persist with such a poor measure as time to-day is simply to
ignore all the achievements of accountancy since, which are now capable of
providing the measurement required. Many of the problems of intellectual
property rights, especially in new fields such as biotechnology and
information processing, are actually caused by having to use time as the very
crude measure of a patent, copyright or other grant.
The empirical research underlying this proposal shows how incentives
to invent could be maintained or even enhanced by the use of capital
payments for licences, instead of royalties. We think that if both objectives of
this proposal could be achieved, there would be considerable benefits in terms
of S&T policy. We therefore consider that although this is clearly a long-term
project, it is worth investigating further (ETAN Report, 1999, Section 3.4).
4. The accounting calculations7
The advantages of bringing money into the measurement of intellectual property
which led the EU Committee to this conclusion will be discussed further below.
Before this, it is necessary to examine the nature of the proposal in more detail,
including its practicality.
As the ETAN Report observes, when intellectual property first came into
existence, there was no alternative to time as its measure, although there is a neat
conjunction between the first Venetian patent ordinance in 1474 and Paciola’s treatise
on formal double-entry bookkeeping, published in the same city twenty years later.
Early copyrights, for example, were for a term of apprenticeship (7 years); patents for
two terms. A modern patent gives its owner 20 years exclusivity in making, using and
selling the invention. It is obvious that it can only be by  chance that this term is just
what is needed to attract the relevant investment, and that in most cases it will either
be too long or too short. In at least one patented invention used in the Concord
aircraft, for example, the protection had actually expired before the first aircraft flew.
In any event, time as a measure is no more than a surrogate for money. If all
inputs and outputs could be measured accurately, then the logic of a grant of
protection would have it last until an investor in R&D had received a multiple of the
investment made which exactly corresponded to the risk which was taken in making
itSuch a multiple would in fact be the reciprocal of that risk. With a lower multiple,
the risk would be regarded as too high, and the investment would not be made, thus
possibly depriving the public of something new and useful; with a higher one, the
protection - and consequently the private benefit - would be more than it needs to be,
and the public benefit (in terms of lower prices and/or improved products from
competitors) correspondingly lower.
Such comprehensive measurement is out of the question, not least because so
much risk is subjectively-assessed, and we aare unable to evaluate how much one8
investor may differ from another in terms of risk-aversion. It would therefore be
necessary to fall back on some socially acceptable multiple. This could either be a
single figure, applicable to all investments in R&D, or there could be different
multiples for different technologies, according to evidence that risk in some is higher
than in others, or even because a greater public need for invention in some areas is
considered to justify a bigger incentive.
4.1 The profits “multiple”
The first approach towards introducing money into the time measure of intellectual
property considered this way of measuring both investment and gains. According to it,
a firm’s protection of information it had generated would last until it had earned
profits from an invention that were a prescribed multiple of its original risky
investment in it (Kingston, 1987). Once the accounting practicalities came to be
considered, however, it became obvious that this could not be done until costs and
profits in multi-product firms could be allocated definitively with much more
precision than is the norm at present. In particular, it would be necessary to devise and
impose effective procedures to prevent managements from loading ongoing costs
from non-protected products on to protected ones. This would improve profits on the
former and ensure that protection on the latter would never run out, because profits on
them could be prevented from ever reaching the multiple. The ability shown by
Ferranti in the U.K. and Lockheed in the U.S. to manipulate their receipts under cost-
plus Defence contracts in this way confirmed just how difficult it would be to develop
a fraud-proof system.
4.2 Compulsory licencing instead of monopoly
This first approach had envisaged maintaining the monopoly element in the
intellectual property grant, although the length of this monopoly was now intended to
be varied according to the profits earned. Recent academic research, however (much9
of it by Nelson himself) has questioned the efficacy of monopoly for innovation,
because it delays the start of incremental  innovation along different  trajectories by
competing firms (cf. Merges and Nelson, 1990). The patenting of genes illustrates
another facet of this, in that commercial applications need a number of gene
fragments, so that the owner of a patent on a single one of these is in a “blocking”
position that can hold development up to ransom (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).
In fact, it is ironic that if the existing patent system actually worked in practice
as it is supposed to do in theory, there would be even less innovation than there is.
Empirical research has shown that in contrast to a U.S. patent’s former nominal 17-
year term, the average period of effective protection was no more than three years
(Mansfield et al. 1981; Levin et al. 1987). Worse still, the cost to the imitator of
producing a competitive product within  that period, has been shown to be less than
what the invention had cost the originating firm. Instead of relying for innovation
diffusion on the failure of the patent system to deliver the protection it promises,
therefore, it would clearly be better to use compulsory licencing to get the process of
diffusion started as early as possible.
This would not eliminate the monopoly element in grants, but would change it
from the exclusive right of “making, using and selling,” to that of granting licences to
others to “make, use and sell.”  It would put into practice the dictum of Chief Justice
Ellenborough that whosoever “will take the benefit of the monopoly, he must as an
equivalent perform the duty attached to it on reasonable terms” (Quoted in Epstein
1998 p. 283:  104 English Reports 210-211).
Innovatory managements have never shown any enthusiasm for compulsory
licencing, because they think that any form of copying must mean loss to whoever
originates information. This is not necessarily the case. Scherer’s study of such10
licencing in more than 100 U.S. Antitrust settlements  showed “little if any adverse
impact on the target companies’ R&D investments” (2001).
A classic example of this is the transistor, which in fact we know about
through Richard Nelson’s own early research. Because of an Antitrust Consent
Decree, Western Electric, the owners of Bell Laboratories where it was invented, was
prevented from manufacturing transistors itself. Consequently, it licenced the patent
widely (Nelson, 1962). According to conventional wisdom, it should have lost out
through not having a patent monopoly to exploit exclusively. In fact, it  is far more
likely that so many firms took a licence from Bell Labs. that the number of fields of
application  of transistors grew much more rapidly than it would have done if
transistor development had remained exclusively in Western Electric’s hands. The
resulting new markets provided opportunities for Western Electric which developed
quicker and were eventually larger than if the firm had been the sole exploiter of
transistors through a patent monopoly. The wealth of the world was undoubtedly
much greater, and Western Electric shared in this additional growth. Because of the
compulsory licencing which led to this growth, it probably made more money out of
its path-breaking invention in the end. It is also significant that the most profitable of
all University-originating patents, for the Cohen-Boyer gene-splicing invention, is
also the most widely licenced.
4.3 A multiple of R&D costs
Given compulsory licencing, how could investors in R&D still be enabled to hope for
high returns to match the risks they run? The idea of a multiple of R&D costs was
again invoked, but this time it would define the amount of a capital payment for a
licence. The objective would be to ensure that  a second or later comer could be
allowed to use an originator’s information by sharing retrospectively in the
investment  and in the risk  which had brought the information into being. A model for11
establishing the price for a compulsory licence could therefore be seen as a sort of
inverted version of Capital Asset Pricing. The price of a compulsory licence cannot be
computed in the same manner as the values of other financial assets - namely as the
present value of the expected future cash flow stream discounted at an appropriate
risk-adjusted rate of return. Licencees may be able to estimate their expected cash
flows as a function of the profits derived from the exploitation of a licence, but no-one
can calculate the risk the originator took to produce information which others, once
they grasped its commercial significance, would want to use. This is all the more so,
since the very first money that is put behind an idea involves uncertainty rather than
risk, and is to that extent irrational. For these reasons, some socially-acceptable
multiple of the money the originator risked must be used to set the price of a licence
which is to be compulsory. Moreover, such a multiple must be attractive enough to
encourage very high-risk investments.
The logic of payment for such a licence through a once-off capital amount,
rather than  by royalties, is that this investment is now a sunk cost for the originator. If
the objective is to have a second or later comer share retrospectively in both the
amount and the risk of the investment which the originator had made, there is no
reason why that sharing should be dependent on a licencee’s future success in using
the information, which would be the case with royalty payments.
It should be stressed that the multiple would only set the price at which the
originator of information would have  to grant a licence for its use by another. The
proposed arrangements would not prevent any type or number of licence agreements
between willing buyers and willing sellers. No licence which would be granted under
the present system, therefore, could be prevented by what is now proposed.
4.4 Initial empirical research12
The records of the Small Business Innovation Research Programs (SBIR) in the
United States provided a source of empirical data on how such compulsory licencing
arrangements might work out in practice. These programs were established by Statute
in 1982, according to which all the public Agencies with the biggest research contract
budgets are bound to divert a small percentage of their funds to  firms with no more
than 500 employees, according to a prescribed formula. This involves at least one
open competition annually for first stage awards of up to $75,000 and second stage
awards of up to $750,000, the intention being that venture capitalists will take over in
the third stage to bring the best ideas to market. These programs have been extremely
successful, and now put more than $1 billion annually into smaller-firm R&D (State
of Small Business: a Report of  the President (1997).
The results of these awards in terms of commercial products are carefully
monitored and published by the U.S. Small Business Administration. Thus, it was
possible to track the full history of 23,000 cases, involving about 200,000
applications. Each of these applications presumably was for an idea which the owners
or managers of a firm considered to have the potential of eventually  being a new
product on the market. What makes these histories so valuable is that an SBIR award
covers all research costs, including the firm’s normal overhead. It is even recognised
that the conduct of research has an opportunity cost for a firm in terms of
management distraction from more immediately paying activities, and consequently
7% of an award can be taken as a contribution to this.
4.5 First estimates of “multiples”
In all these 23,000 cases, where the full cost of the R&D is known, the records show
that 1 in 9 applications won a first-stage award, that 1 in 2 of these won a second-
stage award, and that 1 in 6 of these in turn became a product on the market within 7
years. The results make it clear just how risky the innovation process is. Since the13
probability of a series of discrete events is the product of their individual probabilities,
the odds against an idea going through all stages and becoming a product on the
market are worse than one hundred to one. Many products fail after reaching the
market, so that the odds against having a real “winner” must be very much worse.
From the point of  view of what is now proposed for reform of intellectual
property, it is the figures for risk at each stage that are most useful. The reciprocal of
these estimates of risk is the corresponding  “multiple” which would put an investor
who comes in at a later stage on level terms with the originator. That is, by paying the
originator the appropriate multiple of what the originator had invested in generating
the information, for the right to use it, a newcomer would share fairly, retrospectively,
in both that investment and its risk.
 From the SBIR figures, therefore, assuming that the amount of a first stage
award enables enough information to be produced to obtain a patent or to make a
prototype, and another firm now wishes to take advantage of this, it appears that this
second firm ought to pay eight times the originating firm’s investment in R&D to date
for a compulsory licence. If the second firm was more cautious, so that it waited to
compete until the first firm had actually reached the stage of putting a product on the
market, then the payment should be four times the first firm’s R&D expenditure to
that time, which would of course be very considerably larger than it had been to the
patent/prototype stage (Kingston, 1994).
5. Research for general application
It was possible to obtain these first  insights into “multiples” because in the cases
studied, all the R&D costs were paid by the State through SBIR awards, for which
comprehensive data are published. General application of the arrangements proposed
would depend in the first instance upon how far modern accounting techniques are
capable of establishing an acceptable base figure for the cost of R&D on particular14
informational outputs, when firms are funding it themselves. This is the figure to
which the multiple would eventually apply to set the price for a compulsory licence to
use the information. On  this point, it has been expertly observed that
proving such costs will not be difficult or burdensome. Patent applicants and
patentees collect this information anyway for a variety of reasons, including 1)
tax benefits, 2) internal cost accounting, 3) use in project evaluation, 4) use in
licensing negotiations and the like. Patentees appear to have no trouble
showing research expenditures at the damages stage of a patent infringement
suit, and...such information has been introduced in some cases to show the
nonobviousness of the invention involved. Simply adding one more reason to
collect data on the cost of a research project does not appear to pose a major
problem (Merges, 1992, p. 55).
It is also the case that analysts of high-tech stocks on the Nasdaq market are
increasingly paying attention to price/R&D ratios, which in itself must be forcing
innovatory firms towards more precise recording of their investments in research.
5.1 R&D portfolio or individual project?
Should the cost to which the multiple applies be that of a firm’s entire portfolio of
R&D projects, or only the cost of the single project to which the licence relates? A
convincing reason for choosing the portfolio is the extent to which a single success
may reflect many failures, so that the costs of these also deserve to be taken into
account. A second reason for using the portfolio is that if the R&D costs of every
individual product had to be measured precisely, the cost of record-keeping might
become excessive.
Nevertheless, even with use of the R&D portfolio, there would still be an
essential role for more precise accounting, because by no means all of what firms
designate as R&D expenditure is high-risk. Particularly in engineering firms, much of15
the work of R&D departments is routine, dealing with eliminating design faults which
have been discovered through actual use of products, or with incremental
improvements. Often, too, because instrumentation is involved, testing of components
or raw materials is assigned to the same department. The accounting practice in any
firm seeking protection would therefore have to be precise enough to extract the costs
of low or non-risk activities from any figure on which a claim for R&D investment is
to be based.
It consequently seems that the protocols which would apply to the “R&D cost”
aspect of the protection arrangements proposed would only require increased
precision in accounting measurements, using techniques that are in common use
already. Some fairly conventional empirical research would be needed to establish
how far firms’ existing procedures are capable of providing the detail required, and
what additional recording they would need to introduce so to enable the proposed
arrangements to work. If new measurement costs imposed on firms are not excessive,
it can be assumed that managements would be willing to bear the addition to their
accounting budget, since protection of the results of their R&D is so important to
them.
6. Establishing the “multiple”16
Establishing an acceptable “multiple” or “multiples” would be much more demanding
of research. It would probably be politically impossible to bring about the
introduction of money into the time measure of intellectual property if it did not give
at least as much incentive to invest at high risk in research and development as
present arrangements do. This in turn would depend upon what multiple is applied to
the cost of R&D to give the price of a compulsory licence. The obvious point at which
to begin this research is to establish what sort of returns to investment in research and
development the present intellectual property system actually delivers.
It is immediately clear that accounting’s current ways of valuing intangibles
for balance sheet purposes would be of little help in this. The primary objective of
these  appears to be to ensure that intangible assets are not over-valued, and this is at
its clearest in relation to brands, which are the most valuable of all types of such
assets. A justifiable fear of all those who sign off accounts involving brands is that
their values can change instantly and catastrophically, Perrier being a prime example.
One day, it was the most valuable brand of bottled water in the world; the next, it was
virtually worthless because its source had become contaminated. When the same thing
happened to the Farley brand of infant food, a takeover which valued the business at
£40 m. was aborted and liquidation of the business followed.
Periodical publishers are allowed to attribute a value to their titles, but
intellectual property  such as patents or copyrights is valued very conservatively
indeed. Since balance sheet data will not do, other sources of information on the value
of intellectual property must be sought, if a reasonable basis for calculating multiples
is to be established. Several such sources appear to be quite promising.
6.1 Pharmaceutical risks and rewards
The pharmaceutical and related industries depend upon intellectual property
protection more than any other, and are consequently the biggest single user of17
patents. The risks and rewards of pharmaceutical innovation have been well
documented for many years, e.g. by Grabowski and Vernon (1990, 2000). Returns in
this industry were very high in the 1950s, as the potential of the antibiotics revolution
was harvested, then dropped because of more stringent health and safety regulations,
and rebounded since the 1970s, due to factors such as extending the period of patent
protection to take account of time lost in obtaining regulatory clearance.
Grabowski and Vernon report that new product introductions from the 1970s
earned an average annual after-tax return of about 9%. However, the distribution of
returns by individual product was skew, with the majority of their sample of 100 new
drug introductions actually failing to meet average R&D costs. They comment:
While many of these lower decile products will be contributors to firm profits
(in the sense that incremental expected cash flows exceed incremental
development and capital investment cost), a firm’s fully allocated R&D costs
must also be covered over the long run. In this regard, the results indicate that
a firm must have an occasional “blockbuster” compound from the top deciles
of a sales distribution, if it is to cover the large fixed costs which characterizes
the drug development business (1990, p. 816).
These observations relate to established pharmaceutical firms. For the higher risks
involved in start-up firms, Grabowski and Vernon quote evidence to U.S. House of
Representatives Hearings to the effect that in order to obtain venture capital a new
project must be projected to have the ability to generate a 25%-35% annual rate of
return (2000, p. 207).
Clearly, all the Grabowski/Vernon and similar pharmaceutical industry data
could be mined with great advantage for the task of establishing the multiple.
6.2 Empirical research on patent renewal fees18
The skewness in the distribution of returns to R&D investment which Grabowski and
Vernon noted in respect of pharmaceutical innovation is to be found to an even
greater extent in other industries. This emerges from research in those countries which
charge renewal fees for keeping patents in force, in which a group of scholars from
Yale and the London School of Economics have specialised. The assumption of this
research is that if such a fee is not  paid, the patent’s owner considers its value to have
become effectively zero. It is then possible to restrict the focus of the research work to
valuable inventions by examining only  the patents which have their renewal fees paid
for the maximum possible number of years. By doing this for German patents, Pakes
put a maximum value on a patent of about $420,000 in 1980 dollars (1986, p. 777).
Schankerman  and Pakes reported that for patents in Britain, France and Germany,
“the returns appear to be only a small fraction of the domestic R&D expenditure of
the  business enterprises.” The means of the  discounted sum of rewards from patent
age 5 were about $7,000 in Britain and France and $19,000 in Germany. The value of
patents as a proportion of total national R&D expenditure was 0.057 in France, 0.068
in Britain and 0.056 in Germany (1986, pp. 1068, 1074). Schankerman subsequently
estimated that a subsidy to R&D of 15%-35% would be enough to provide an
equivalent incentive to patents (1988, p. 95).
In extraordinarily sharp contrast, later work by Harhoff and Scherer (e.g.
1997, 1998) has produced estimates that are at least two orders of magnitude higher.
They estimated the value of 772 German-owned patents renewed for the maximum
possible term of 18 years by obtaining answers to the following question from their
owners:
If in 1980 you knew what you now know about the profit history of the
invention abstracted here, what is the smallest   amount for which you would
have been willing to sell this patent to an independent third party, assuming19
that you had a bona fide  offer to purchase, and that the buyer would
subsequently exercise its full patent rights? (2000, p. 560).
The values were found to be so skewly distributed that a log normal curve gave the
best fit. No less than 84% of the aggregate value was accounted for by the top 10% of
the inventions studied. Bearing in mind that the latter are only the small minority
(18% of all patents) whose patents were maintained for the maximum possible period,
and making some allowance for the value of the patents which were not so
maintained, it appears safe to assume that about four-fifths of the aggregate value of
all patents is gained by only two or three per cent of them. The skewness of the
distribution is further emphasised by the  69 highest-value patents, where it was found
that
Altogether, the best-estimate values ranged from less than DM 1 million (in 5
cases) to well over DM 1 billion. The mean value was DM 38.8 million if all
69 observations are averaged, and DM 15.1 million if the most lucrative
invention, with a point estimate roughly 15 times that of the second most
valuable invention, is excluded (1997, p. 11).
6.3 Relationship to R&D expenditure
Using the same technique, Scherer and Harhoff also investigated patents issued in
Germany for inventions originating in the United States. These had the additional
benefit that many of them could be matched to reported R&D expenditures:
For the 48 companies with complete data, company-financed research and
development outlays in 1976 totalled $4.8 billion, 27.6% of the reported
$17.44 billion aggregate for all of U.S. industry in that year. Assuming an
average value of $250 million for inventions valued at over $100 million, the
total value of those companies’  inventions was $5.16 billion. That the
estimated value of linked full-term renewed inventions, which comprised only20
a small fraction of all the inventions patented by responding companies,
exceeded (or at least approximated) total company-financed R&D outlays,
suggests that on average the profit rewards to industrial R&D were
appreciable (ibid.).
Similarly skewed patterns to these were later found in about 2000 observations from
six other studies in the U.S., reflecting University as well as private firm research
(Scherer and Harhoff, 2000, p. 560).
In terms of the research necessary before such estimates could be relied upon
for establishing the multiple, the huge discrepancy between the results from the
different studies, depending on the investigatory technique used, would first have to
be resolved. The Scherer/Harhoff figures seem to paint a more realistic picture than
those of  Schankerman and Pakes, since it hardly seems likely that managements
would continue to invest in R&D if the returns (only 5.5% of total R&D expenditure)
were really as poor as they estimate.
On the other hand, any multiple derived from the Scherer/Harhoff data would
be too high. With compulsory licencing, presumably the originator would continue to
exploit the invention, which would be prevented if the buyer "would subsequently
exercise its full patent rights,” as their research question put it.
6.4 Use of patent citations
Yet another promising line of accounting research to help establish appropriate
multiples relates to patent “citations.”  When one patent is cited in a later one, either
by the inventor or by a patent examiner, it testifies to the fact that the later patent is
building on the information in the earlier one, and hence to the quality of the latter.
Work by Trajtenberg (1990) showed that citation levels are indeed an indication of
value. Harhoff then expanded his work on German patents renewed for their full term
by examining the extent to which they were cited, and found that citation frequency21
does indeed rise with economic value. For the most valuable patents, each of their
citations in a later patent is associated with a value of more than $1 million (Harhoff
et al., 1999). If it were  found possible to extrapolate such results to patents which are
not renewed for their full term, they might provide useful qualifications to the German
data discussed above.
6.5 Dispute awards and settlements
Another valuable source of relevant data is the record of awards and settlements
arising from litigation. These will not necessarily indicate the full value of a patent or
copyright, but should at least give an approximate measure of the value of the
information “stolen” from its owner by a single infringer. Appropriately discounted,
and after stripping out litigation costs, this should be the minimum  price that an
infringer should have paid instead for a compulsory licence under the proposed
arrangements.
The website www.bustpatents.com/awards.htm  includes a list of 137 such
awards or settlements in the United States. Half of these were for less than $100
million; 19 were from $100 million to $300 million; and there were 3 very large cases
of $0.7 billion (Digital) $0.9 billion (Polaroid)  and $1.2 billion (Litton Industries). It
seems likely that study of the accounting calculations and estimates argued for by the
parties or made by the Courts in these cases could be useful  in establishing what
multiples would need to be, so as to offer comparable incentives to invest in R&D to
those of existing intellectual property.
7. Some implications of skewed value distributions
It is clear that one of the most difficult questions which accounting research would
face arises from the skewness of rewards to investment in R&D. This has to be
accepted as endemic, given the amount and quality of research already done. From the
Grabowski/Vernon pharmaceutical data, it is evident that the multiple must be22
generous enough to enable firms to make more from their very few successes than
from their many  failures.The Scherer/Harhoff studies are a further reminder that
investment in invention and innovation has many of the elements of a lottery. It is
well-established that the motivation for buying lottery tickets is much less calculation
of the chances of winning, than simply the magnitude of the top prize. People
invariably look optimistically at their chances of winning. Whilst decision-making
about large-scale R&D investments is presumably more rational than that of the
general public in buying lottery tickets, the first money placed behind a new idea can
never be completely rational. Consequently, it may not be possible to discount some
effect on investors of  hopes of  “riches beyond the dreams of avarice.”
1
If this was the only factor, patent-owners might hope that each R&D project in
which they  invest would lead to a patent or patents amongst the 10% that are
extremely valuable, rather than being in the 80% that either barely earn their keep or
fail to provide any return at all. Expressed in terms of the German data quoted earlier,
this could mean that at  the limit, the multiple would have to hold out the possibility
of being one of the five patents, each of which was worth DM 50 million or more,
rather than being geared to the 552 patents renewed to full term (72% of the total)
whose average earnings were less than a single million deutschmarks. But at such
high multiples, no licences would be taken, so that all the potential benefits of
bringing money into the time measurement of intellectual property would be lost.
Consequently, the proposed arrangements should keep the multiple low enough to
make taking a compulsory licence attractive, and provide for the possibility of  very
large returns to the originator through multiple licences.
                                                          
1 “When the sale of Thrale’s brewery was going forward, Dr. Johnson appeared bustling about, with an
ink-horn and pen in his button-hole, like an excise-man, and on being asked what he really considered
to be the value of the property which was to be disposed of, answered, ‘We are not here to sell a parcel
of boilers and vats, but the potentiality of growing rich beyond the dreams of avarice” (Boswell, Life of
Johnson,, 1791, Penguin edition 1979, p. 274).23
7.1 Multiple licences
The socially-acceptable multiple of R&D cost would relate to a single licence. The
more valuable an invention, the more licencees it could be expected to attract, and
each of  these would pay the same amount. The originator could also expect to benefit
from expansion of the total market, through the competitive activities of each of these
licencees in marketing and in incremental innovation.
Thus, in the pharmaceutical industry as measured by Grabowski and Vernon,
if a single licence was bought at a multiple of no more than 2, it would put the
product’ value into the second decile from the top of returns. (Products in decile 8
slightly more than cover average R&D costs, which products in deciles 7 through 1
progressively  fail to do). If three such licences were taken, the payments would put
the product into the most profitable decile (the home of the “blockbuster” drugs).
7.2 Matching present incentives
These figures suggest that there should be different multiples for different industries,
according to the risks prevailing. Since pharmaceutical firms depend overwhelmingly
on the market power they possess from their intellectual property, their managements’
decisions on investing in R&D to capture this, are likely to be the most rational and
risk-averse. In contrast, risk-aversion does not enter at all into research under SBIR
awards, because the State is funding 100% of the cost. No owners of a small firm -
indeed no managers of a firm of any size - could rationally invest in R&D when the
chances against even getting a product on the market are worse than 100 to 1, as the
SBIR figures show them to be. Also, the SBIR calculations take no account of tax on
returns, whereas the Grabowski/Vernon ones do.
Clearly, much accounting research would be needed before specific
recommmendations could be made. Apart from explorations of the sources already
discussed, there would be need to obtain data of the Grabowski/Vernon type for other24
industries, through study of firms’ pricing calculations in proposals for investment in
R&D, the actual outcomes in terms of decisions to endorse or reject a proposal, and in
the case of endorsements, the eventual financial outcomes.
8. Beneficial results
On the assumption that accounting research can provide workable answers to the
questions just discussed, the benefits of the proposal appear to include at least the
following:-
8.1 Flexibility
Merges (1996) argues against compulsory licencing on the ground of its inflexibility,
but this would not apply if it is associated with bringing money into the measurement
of intellectual property grants in the way proposed. The combination would then
operate in sharp contrast to the “one size fits all” characteristic of the present system.
Varying the multiple according to industry could also reflect differentials in the
importance of intellectual property in each, as compared with other kinds of market
power. Complex technologies such as electronics, for example, have much less need
for patent protection than pharmaceuticals or biotechnology. Changes to the multiple
could be made as experience shows they are needed, for example to accelerate
investment in a new technology which promised special public benefit.
8.2 More incremental innovation
Next, the public would obtain the benefits of competition in every field through the
development of new ideas along as many different trajectories as the technology
warranted, as in the transistor example. No firm would be prevented from developing
any new market as long as it was ready to share retrospectively in both the investment
and the risk which had brought that market into being.
8.3 Freeing up information use in complex technologies25
Of all the types of industry and business which use intellectual property, the proposed
change would be most beneficial in complex technologies, which are rapidly
increasing in importance. Firms in these use patents in quite different ways to those in
simple technologies, such as chemicals. They seek to protect  “every blade of grass”
by patents, so as to be able to use these as trading currency to prevent being locked
out from use of competitors’ incremental innovations. The need for this is due to
banning of patent “pools” (which were an efficient way of achieving these transfers)
by Competition Authorities, and it involves much wasted effort. Compulsory
licencing with capital payments as proposed would have all the advantages of a patent
pool, with no anti-competitive drawbacks (cf. Kash and Kingston, 2001).
8.4 Restoring the value of intellectual property to small firms
In any reform of intellectual property, special consideration needs to be given to the
position of smaller firms. These are productive of inventions to a degree that is quite
disproportionate to their resources. In the U.S., for example, they receive less than 4%
of Federal support for research, yet they produce more than half of the innovations
and get close to two-fifths of all patents (State of Small Business Report, 1997).
Smaller firms are prolific users of intellectual property because they lack other types
of market power to protect the information they produce. Larger firms can do this
through their investments in productive assets, and in marketing (being early into a
market has been shown to be of the highest value (Levin et al., 1987;  Arundel et al.,
1995; Cohen et al., 2000)).
There have been so many cases of large and dynamic new businesses which
were built on a single radical  invention (Xerox and Hewlett-Packard being
outstanding  examples) that it would be particularly desirable that bringing money
into the measure of a grant was not harmful to smaller firms.  One of the reasons why
the SBIR Programs have been so successful is that (contrary  to earlier U.S.26
Government practice) awardees own the intellectual property arising from their
research. It is this - and indeed only this - which enables them to obtain were easily
able to get follow-on venture capital funding to bring their inventions to market. If
large firms compulsory licences on new technology which smaller ones had
originated, the small firms would be prevented from growing and industrial
concentration would be intensified. Small firms with ideas would be vulnerable to
large ones with money. In particular, new firms (which, as noted earlier, have to be
able to offer the prospect of high returns to venture capitalists to enable them to take
high early-stage risks) should not have their prospects clouded by arrangements which
would bring competition into their market before they have found their feet.
Clearly, therefore, if the proposed change in the way intellectual property is
measured is to reinforce smaller high-tech firms rather than to undermine them, this
type of predation would have to be prevented.  There are several ways in which this
objective might be achieved. The most obvious is only to apply the proposed changes
to larger businesses. Large firms might then object that small firms could obtain a
compulsory licence from them, but the system would not work in reverse. (Such an
imbalance might in fact be socially beneficial in terms of innovation, given the proven
dynamism of small  firms and the inertia  of large ones). If it was necessary to meet
this point, only firms whose own measurable R&D investment is above a prescribed
threshold might be entitled to buy compulsory licences. Or the multiple could be
weighted according to the relative size (or indeed, age) of the parties.
Still another possibility would be to set up facilities to assist small firms in
buying licences to avoid the  large-firm concentration which up-front capital charges
caused when they were applied to oil and gas exploration licences in the U.S.
(Scherer, 2001). There should of course be no question of applying the proposed
changes to individual inventors, since their investment in R&D would be so small that27
a compulsory licence on any good invention they produced – which in fact is a very
rare occurrence in spite of how skilfully the inventors’ lobby articulates its case –
could be obtained for very little. The classical monopoly- and time-based patent
system was set up to protect them, and should revert to serving their needs. The
changes now proposed are designed to deal with inventions which result from
significant investment, not the “flashes of genius” of individual inventors.
8.5 Giving appropriate protection to software development
If the proposal were to be put into effect, the beneficial effects of intensified
competition would be felt immediately by the public in relation to computer
programs. As a new way of generating information, these needed a new kind of
protection. Forcing software instead into copyright has resulted in programs receiving
absurdly inappropriate terms of protection which can be up to 120 years. Among other
outcomes, this has made conflict between Competition authorities and Microsoft
inevitable in the U.S. and elsewhere.
8.6 Rescuing biotechnology from the patent trap
Similarly, if ever there was a new kind of information, it is DNA, the “operating
system” which programs biological cells. Genetic inventions therefore clearly called
for a new and appropriate type of protection of their own. But just as software had
been forced into copyright, genomics was forced into patents. The results of this have
caused much concern, firstly because the science is still too young to permit sound
decisions to be made as to what should be legally protected and how this could best be
done. Secondly, a large amount of the research in this area is publicly funded and
freely available, so that it is impossible to be precise about the balance between the
public and private contributions in any disclosure in support of an application for a
patent. Patent monopolies lasting twenty years may consequently be granted to private
firms in respect of advances to which their own contribution may be small compared28
to the scale of the investment (and its related risk) which has been provided by
taxpayers. But with money as the measure of patent grants, firms could not “free-ride”
on the results of research carried out with public funds, since the “multiple” which
they could charge for a licence would only apply to the amount of their own related
R&D investment.
As noted earlier, the classical “blocking” position of the holder of a patent on
a single gene fragment may frustrate commercialisation of the results of genomic
research, thus making the patent system an impediment to innovation rather than a
stimulus to it  (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).  Concern with issues such as this caused
the U.S. President and the British Prime Minister to issue an unprecedented joint
statement on March 14, 2000, urging private sector scientists to “release raw
fundamental information about the human DNA sequence and its variants rapidly into
the public domain.” To judge by subsequent comments of those who direct the
publicly funded project, they are not hopeful that this will happen. Simultaneous
measurement by money as well as time would deal with all such problems by making
blocking of development impossible whilst maintaining or indeed improving
incentives to invest in R&D.
8.7 Balancing producer and user needs in Databases
The most extreme example of the inability of traditional arrangements to provide
protection that is enough to give the incentive for high-risk investment in  the
generation of information, but no more than this, is in relation to electronic databases.
These represent yet another new way of producing information, brought about by
nothing but investment, in which creativity is replaced by “sweat of the brow.” Using
the traditional paradigm, an EU Directive effectively offers producers of these the
possibility of perpetual monopolies (European Commission, 1996). This has been29
described by two eminent American legal academics as “a monstrous caricature of
intellectual property laws” (Reichman and Samuelson, 1997, p.164).
In contrast, the new arrangements proposed for measurement would give
compilers of electronic databases all the incentive they need, whilst making their data
available as freely as possible.
 8.8 Reducing wasteful litigation
The “winner takes all” element in so many types of intellectual property inevitably
fosters litigation, and the volume of this has been expanding even more rapidly than
the use of intellectual property. Just how serious this problem is, has been officially
recognized in a recent Report of the United States Advisory Commission on Patent
Law Reform, when it stated that
patent litigation has become an increasingly inefficient, ineffective and
undesirable means of resolving patent related disputes...The Commission fears
that, unless the problems of cost and delay in patent litigation are addressed
now, the central purpose of the patent system to provide an effective incentive
for development and commercialization of new technology will be seriously
eroded. Such an erosion could well prove a threat to the very existence of the
patent system . . . (1992, pp. 78, 76).
In addition to the measurable costs of litigation, there are many others that are very
substantial and that certainly have important social implications. These are the
burdens in terms of distraction, diversion of energy, and misdirection of creativity that
any intellectual property dispute imposes on innovatory firms. Worst of all, litigation
costs are destructive of the exceptionally valuable contributions to innovation that
smaller firms have proved they can make. It is obvious that the measurable costs of
prosecuting or defending an action for infringement of intellectual property are far
beyond the resources of all but the largest firms, apart from the fact that the burden of30
the costs that cannot be measured (such as distraction from more immediately paying
tasks) falls most heavily on smaller ones.
With compulsory licencing in the form proposed, there is likely to be much
less infringement and waste of time, energy, talent and money in litigation. Because
lead time is recognised by business men as one of the best ways of protecting
innovation, competitors would be likely to calculate that it is in their interest to pay
the capital sum required for a licence and get into production quickly, rather than take
the risk of losing  “early mover advantage” in the market as well as an infringement
action. Also, it would be reasonable to expect the Courts to treat infringers more
severely than they do now, because infringers would have had an option to purchase a
licence which they had not exercised.
8.9 Contributing to a humane international free trade regime
The World Trade Organization was brought into being in 1994 as a new and extended
version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. However, TRIPS (the Trade-
Related Intellectual Property Section of this) has met with enormous opposition from
poorer countries, which  regard it as a vehicle for Western technological imperialism.
Not unreasonably, they ask why they should give monopolies for numbers of years in
their countries to Western brands, inventions and media productions, when they
themselves produce nothing similar which could benefit from reciprocal protection in
Western countries.
Adding money to time in the measurement of intellectual property could do
much to resolve these tensions. The survival of TRIPS may even depend upon it. The
violent demonstrations at Seattle, Davos and elsewhere which have prevented WTO
meetings, show the depth and breadth of feeling against it. Since the multiple in a
money measure of intellectual property would only apply to investment in R&D in
each individual country, it would instantly remove what is seen as  the “imperialistic”31
aspect of the monopolies granted under the present system and defuse this world-wide
anger.
9. Conclusion
Richard Nelson has rightly identified some important aspects of the present crisis in
intellectual property, but the change discussed above could meet many of his
concerns.
It was a principle of the great nineteenth-century scientist, Lord Kelvin, that “we
advance according to the precision of our measures,” and this must surely be just as
true of the social as well as the natural sciences. There is consequently every reason to
hope that intellectual property could benefit greatly from the much more precise
measurement that modern accounting techniques could bring to bear on it through
adding money to time.
The Agenda which has been sketched out above would only be the beginning
of the accounting and other research which would be needed to underwrite such a
radical change of measurement means. No doubt once it had been undertaken more
and better sources of data would be found. Achieving precision about the costs of
doing R&D should not be difficult: the main challenge would be to develop multiples
of these costs which would offer incentives for risky investment in R&D that are at
least as good as those from the present system of intellectual property.
References
Arundel, A., van de Paal., A., & Soete, L. (1995). Innovation strategies of Europe’s
largest industrial firms: Results of the PACE survey. Luxembourg,  European
Commission, Directorate-General XIII, EIMS Publication 23.
Cohen, W.M., Nelson, R.R., & Walsh, John (2000): Appropriability  mechanisms: use
and change over time. Paper presented to the Swedish International Symposium on
Law, Economics and Intellectual Property. Gothenburg, June 26-30.32
Commission on Patent Law Reform (1992). Report. Washington, D.C.. U.S. 
Government Printing Office.
Epstein, R. A. (1998). Principles for a Free Society. Reading, MA.,
Perseus Books.
ETAN Report, 1999. Strategic Dimensions of Intellectual Property Rights in the
context of S&T Policy, ISBN  92-828-7309-9. Brussels. European Commission, D-G
XII.
European Commission (1996). Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 11 March, 1996 on the Legal Protection of Databases, 1996  O.J. (L.
77) 20.
Grabowski, H. & Vernon, J. (1990). A New Look at the Returns and Risks to
Pharmaceutical R&D. Management Science 36  (7),  804-821.
Grabowski, H. & Vernon, J. (2000). The Determinants of Pharmaceutical Research
and Development Expenditures. Journal of Evolutionary Economics 10,
 (1-2),  201-216.
Harhoff, D., Narin, F., Scherer, F. M. & Vopel, K. (1997). Citation Frequency and the
Value of Patented Invention. Discussion Paper No. 97-27. Centre for European 
Economic Research, Mannheim.
Harhoff, D., Scherer, F. M. & Vopel, K. (1998). Exploring the Tail of Patented
Invention Value Distributions. Discussion Paper (January, 1998 Revision). 
Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim.
Harhoff, D., Narin, F., Scherer, F. M. and Vopel, Katrin (1999):  Citation Frequency
and the Value of Patented Inventions. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81  (3)
511-515.
Heller, M. A., & Eisenberg, R. (1998). Can Patents Prevent Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research. Science 280 . 698-701.
Kash, D. A. & Kingston, W. (2001). Patents in a World of Complex 
Technology. Science and Public Policy . February.
Kingston, W. (ed.) (1987). Direct Protection of Innovation, Chapter 9.
Dordrecht/Boston, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Kingston, W. (1994). Compulsory Licencing with Capital Payments as an 
Alternative to Monopoly Grants for Intellectual Property.
Research Policy  23, 5 (November). 661-672.
Kingston, W. (2001): Innovation Needs Patents Reform
Kronz, H. (1983). Patent Protection for Innovations. A Model. European 
Intellectual Property Review,  No. 5, 178-183.33
Lanjouw, J., Pakes, A., & Putnam,  J. (1998):  How to Count Patents and Value
Intellectual Property: the Uses of  Patent Renewal and Application Data. Journal of 
Industrial Economics 46, 405-432.
Levin, R. C., Klevorick,  A..K., Nelson, R. R., & Winter, S.G. (1987). Yale Study 
of R&D Appropriability Methods. Brookings Economic Papers.
Mansfield, E M., Schwartz, E., & Wagner, S. (1981). Imitation Costs and 
Patents. An Empirical Study. Economic Journal , 904.
Mazzolini, Roberto and Richard R. Nelson (1998):  “The benefits and costs of strong
patent protection: a contribution to the current debate.” Research Policy 27 pp. 273-
284
Merges, R. (1992). Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability. High 
Technology Law Journal 7  , 1-70.
Merges, R. (1996): Contracting into liability rules: intellectual property rights and
Collective Rights Organizations. California Law Review 84  (5) pp. 1293-1393.
Merges, R., & Nelson, Richard R. (1990). On  the Complex Economics  of  Patent
Scope.  Columbia Law Review 90 , 839-916.
Nelson, Richard R. (ed.) (1962) The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity. 
Princeton, Princeton University Press.
Nelson, Richard R. (2000a): “Selection criteria and selection processes in cultural
evolution theory.” In John Ziman (ed.): Technological Innovation as an Evolutionary 
Process. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Nelson, Richard R. (2000b): “Observations on the post Bayh-Dole rise of patenting at
American Universities.” Paper read at the Swedish International Symposium on
Economics, Law and Intellectual Property, Gothenburg, June 26-30.
Pakes, A. (1986).  Patents as options. Some estimates of the value of holding 
European patent stocks. Econometrica 54,  755-784.
Reichman, J. H. (1994). Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright 
Paradigms. Columbia Law Review 94,   2442-2558.
Reichman, J. H.  & Samuelson, P.A. (1997). Intellectual Property Rights in Data? 
Vanderbilt Law Review 50,  52-166.
Samuelson, P. A . (1997):The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO. Virginia Journal 
of International Law 37 (2)  360-440.
Schankerman, M. (1996): Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in European
Countries During the Post-1950 Period. Economic Journal 96, pp. 1052-1076.
Schankerman, M. (1998): How valuable is patent protection? Estimates by 
Technology Field. Rand  Journal of Economics 29, 77-107.34
Scherer, F.M. (1998): “The Innovation Lottery.” Paper presented at NYU Law 
School Conference, June 25, 1998.
Scherer, F.M. (2001): Personal communication.
Scherer, F.M., Harhoff, D. & Kukies, J. (1998). Uncertainty and the Size Distribution
of Rewards from Technological Innovation. Discussion Paper (March, 1998 revision).
Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim.
Scherer, F.M., & Harhoff, D. (2000). Technology Policy for a World of Skew-
distributed outcomes. Research Policy 29 , 559-566.
The State of Small Business: a Report of the President (1997): United States 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.
Thurow, L. C. (1997).  Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights. 
Harvard Business Review, September/October,  95-103.
Trajtenberg, M. (1990). A Penny for your Quotes. Patent Citations and the Value of
Innovations. RAND Journal of Economics, 21, 172-187.
Vaver, D. (2000). Patently Absurd. Oxford Today 13  (1),  21-2.